ABSTRACT Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a very attractive cryptographic primitive due to its unnecessity of any certificate managements. Nevertheless, the user revocation problem in IBE remains an elusive research problem and hence, it is an important research topic. One possible approach in achieving revocations is to update user's decryption keys. However, to avoid the need of secret channels, public time keys need to be issued to allow this update to occur. It is unfortunate that this method often suffers from two problems: 1) the user has to maintain linearly growing decryption keys; and 2) the revoked users can still access ciphertexts prior to revocation. At the first glance, proxy re-encryption technique may provide a solution to this problem, but the ciphertexts will become longer after each re-encryption, which makes it impractical. In this paper, we present a revocable identity-based encryption scheme with cloud-aided ciphertext evolution. Our construction solves the two aforementioned problems via ciphertext evolution implemented by the cloud. In addition, the size of ciphertexts in the cloud remains constant size regardless of evolutions. The scheme is provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks based on the BDH problem. The comparisons with the existing related works show that our scheme enjoys better efficiency, and thus it is practical for the data sharing in cloud storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public key encryption (PKE) provides an excellent solution to the problem of key distribution in symmetric key. An important issue in PKE is the authenticity of user public keys. The traditional PKE authenticates user public key via releasing certificates. Nevertheless, the certificate management is a heavy burden to the public key system, which is the primary drawback in PKE. To overcome this drawback, Shamir set forth a new notion called ''Identity based public key cryptography'' in 1984 [16] . This public key cryptosystem employs every user's unique identity as its public key. Therefore, the authenticity of this public key is no longer questionable, and hence, there is no certificate required. Since the first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme was presented by Boneh and Franklin [3] in 2001, IBE has attracted a lot of attentions from both academia and industry. To date, there have been many IBE schemes proposed in the literature such as [2] and [4] - [7] . One important issue to make identity-based encryption practical is the user revocation. This problem was first discussed in BF's seminal work [3] . As stated earlier, different from the traditional public key system, there is no certificate in identity-based system. Therefore, the conventional user revocation technique is not applicable to the identity-based systems. Actually, the user private key can be viewed as an implicit certificate. Boneh and Franklin suggested that the PKG periodically issues new private keys by attaching time tags for non-revoked users. The user revocation can be launched by the PKG stoping the issuing of new user private keys with the time tags. Unfortunately, this revocation system is very impractical, because the PKG has to carry heavy overhead (O(n) where n is the number of non-revoked users), especially for the establishing of secret channels. Boldyreva et al. [1] presented the first scalable revocable IBE scheme in 2008. In their scheme, only public channels are required for the key-updating. Furthermore, they utilized the complete subtree to realize a logarithm growth O(log(n)) of key-updating with non-revoked users.
With this approach of revocation method, many revocable identity-based encryption (RIBE) schemes have been proposed. However, when taking these schemes in some application scenarios, some problems arise. Let's consider the scenario of secure data sharing in cloud storage by applying a revocable identity-based encryption. Suppose there are four entities involved, namely the data owner, the data user, the cloud server and the PKG. To our best knowledge, the existing schemes suffer from two shortcomings or at least one of them.
• The data user needs to utilize the time key TK ID,t as well as the private key to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted at the time t. So, the data user has to maintain all the time keys (O(t)) (or decryption keys computed from time keys) for different time-period decryptions. This consumes a lot of storage resources for data users, thus it is very impractical especially in source-limited environments.
• When a user is revoked by the PKG for such as private key compromise or expiring, the user can still decrypt those ciphertexts prior to revocation in the cloud. Though some works [10] do not have these problems, they suffer from new problems: the ciphertexts grow longer with the number of ciphertext-transformation (the basic construction), or the costly computation and communication of re-encryption keys between the user and the server. We give a new and efficient RIBE scheme that can solve the two problems. As shown in Fig. 1 , the cloud server helps a ciphertext C uploaded by the data owner evolve to a new one C ; then the data user decrypts the ciphertext by employing merely its current time key as well as private key. So, the data user only needs to keep one time key -the current time key; and the revoked data user cannot access any ciphertext including those before revocation; no matter how many times a ciphertext in the cloud evolves, the length of the ciphertext remains unchanged; different to proxy re-encryption, no computation or communication is needed for the re-encryption keys. We construct a revocable identity-based encryption scheme with (cloud-aided) ciphertext evolution (RIBE-CE). Our scheme is proved secure against chosen ciphertext attacks based on the hardness of the BDH problem in the random oracle model. We also analyze the efficiency by comparing our scheme with the existing works.
Organization of the Paper: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we give the definition of a cloud-aided RIBE-CE scheme and its security model against two types of adversaries. The related mathematical notions are also reviewed in this section. Sect. 3 presents the concrete RIBE-CE construction and the formal security proofs. In Sect. 4, we analyze the efficiency by comparing with other related representative works. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
A. RELATED WORKS
Boldyreva et al. [1] first presented a scalable revocable IBE scheme in 2008. The complete subtree structure is used to obtain a logarithm growth of updating key. This work was subsequently improved in [12] with strong security. In 2013, Seo and Emura introduced decryption-key-exposure threat and presented a revocable IBE scheme that can resist decryption-key-exposure [15] . Sun et al. [17] extended Seo et al.'s scheme to the certificateless setting. In 2017, Watanabe et al. [20] gave a new revocable and decryptionkey-exposure resistent IBE scheme. The scheme has short public parameters in prime-order groups. A very recent work showed a revocable hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme [8] .
Unfortunately, almost all these RIBE works suffer from the two drawbacks mentioned above especially in the applications like cloud storage. In 2014, Liang et al. [10] employed proxy re-encryption technique to construct a revocable identity-based encryption scheme. Their scheme solves the two problems by re-encrypting ciphertexts in the cloud. However, the ciphertexts become longer and longer with the number of re-encryption. Reference [14] improved Liang et al.'s scheme on the efficiency but suffers from increasing list of decryption keys for different-period ciphertexts. References [18] and [19] pointed out the security weakness of Liang et al.'s scheme against collusion attacks. Other related works are such as [9] and [13] . In these works, the revocation is implemented by a third party e.g. the cloud server. They have special applications.
II. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODEL
A. SCHEME DEFINITION An RIBE-CE scheme is made up of the following algorithms.
• Setup(k): Taking a security parameter k as input, this algorithm outputs a master secret key msk and public parameters params.
• Private-Key-Extract(params, msk, ID): Taking params, msk and an identity ID as input, this algorithm outputs a private key SK ID , which is transmitted to the user via a secret channel. It is run by the PKG
• Time-Key-Update(params, msk, ID, t): Taking params, msk, an identity ID and a time tag t as input, this algorithm outputs a time key TK ID,t , which is transmitted to the user via a public channel. It is run by the PKG
• Encrypt(params, ID, t, M ): Taking params, ID, t and a message M as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C. It is run by the data owner.
• Decrypt(params, SK ID , TK ID,t ): Taking params, SK ID , TK ID,t and C as input, this algorithm outputs a message M or a failure symbol. It is run by the data user.
• Revoke(ID, t): Taking ID and t as input, the PKG stops issuing the time key TK ID,t for the user.
• Ciphertext-Evolve(params, C, TK ID,t , t ): Taking TK ID,t , t and C as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C . It is run by the cloud server.
B. SECURITY MODEL
Two types of adversaries are considered: an outside adversary who knows all time keys; an inside adversary who is a malicious revoked user. The cloud server can be viewed as an outside adversary. We define the IND-CCA security of revocable identity based encryption with ciphertext evolution via the following game between the challenger C and the adversary A. Let A be A o or A i that denote an outside adversary or an inside adversary, respectively.
Setup: C runs the setup algorithm to provide public parameters params to A, while keeps the master secret key msk for itself.
Phase 1: Then, A may make some private key queries Q privatekey , time key queries Q timekey , decryption queries Q decryption and ciphertext evolution queries Q ciphertextevolution to the challenger C on its behalf. The query-answers are described as follows.
A outputs two messages M 0 and M 1 of the same length, an identity ID * and a time tag t * . The challenger randomly chooses β from {0, 1} and encrypts M β to output a challenge ciphertext C * .
Phase 2: A continues to make queries as before, subject to the constrain that A o cannot make a private key extraction query on ID * and A i cannot make a time key query on (ID * , t * ).
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess β ∈ {0, 1}. The advantage of A in the above game is defined by = | Pr(β = β) − 1/2|. An RIBE-CE scheme is said to be IND-CPA (indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks) secure if no PPT adversary has non-negligible .
C. BILINEAR PAIRING AND COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTION
Bilinear paring. G 1 is an additive group with prime order q and a generator P. G 2 is a multiplicative group with the same order q. A bilinear pairing is defined as e :
satisfying the conditions (1) as described below. . We can give a generic construction of revocable identity-based encryption with (cloud-aided) ciphertext evolution (RIBE-CE for short).
TK ID,t is sent to both the user and the cloud server.
−Encrypt(params, ID, t, M ):
C 0 = IBE CCA Enc (M , ID); C = IBE CCA Enc (C 0 , ID||t); output the final ciphertext C. −Decrypt(params, SK ID , TK ID,t , C): C 0 = IBE CCA Dec (C, TK ID,t ); M = IBE CCA Dec (C 0 , SK ID ).
−Revoke(ID, t):
The PKG does not generat the time key TK ID,t .
−Ciphertext-Evolve(params, C, TK ID,t , t ):
The security of the generic construction can be provided by Theorem 1 below.
Theorem 1: If the underlying IBE scheme is IND-CCA secure then our generic construction of RIBE-CE is IND-CCA secure against both an outside adversary A o and an inside adversary A i .
Proof: Suppose B is an adversary against the IBE scheme. It will acts as the challenger interacting with A. B has a list of IBE public parameters params which is published to A as well as some other necessary parameters. Then A may make some queries. VOLUME 6, 2018 Private key extraction query: A may continue to make queries as before, subject to the following constrains
• the private key extraction query on ID * is not allowed;
(especially for A o )
• the time key query on (ID * , t * ) is not allowed; (especially for A i )
• the decryption query on C * of (ID * , t * ) is not allowed. Guess. In the end, A gives a guess β ∈ {0, 1}. B output the same guess.
If A's advantage to win the above game is , it is clear that B's advantage to break the IND-CCA security of the IBE scheme is not less than .
B. CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION
To be concrete, the construction can be efficient.
• Setup(k): Select two cyclic groups (G 1 , +) and (G 2 , ·) of the same order q. P is a generator of G 1 . e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is a bilinear pairing. Choose s ∈ Z * q at random and compute P 0 = sP. Select four hash functions:
l is the message length. The system parameters params are
The master secret key mk is s.
• Private-Key-Extract(params, mk, ID): The PKG computes Q ID = H 1 (ID) and then calculates SK ID = sQ ID as the private key of user ID.
• • Encrypt(params, M , ID, t): The data owner does the following to encrypt a message M .
• Decrypt(params,
The data user computes
Then it can recover the message by calculating
If the equation U = H 3 (σ, M )P holds, the message M is correct.
• Revoke(ID, t): If the user ID with identity needs to be revoked at the time t, the PKG stops generating the time key TK ID,t for the user.
• Ciphertext-Evolve(params,
The cloud computes
then updates the ciphertext to be C = (U , V , W ). Correctness 1. To recover the plaintext from the ciphertext C = (U , V , W ), the key point is to compute σ . So, we first verify the correctness of σ .
So, if the equation U = H 3 (σ, M )P holds, the message M is correct.
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Correctness 2. To verify the decryption on the ciphertext after evolution C = (U , V , W ), we can observe that
Obviously, the V in C = (U , V , W ) keeps the encryption algorithm. So the decryption is also suitable to the evolving ciphertexts.
Remark: If the data user is revoked, the cloud randomly chooses TK ID,t ∈ G 1 for the ciphertext evolution. From the point of practical view, 1) the revocation is also the cloud server's wish; 2) the message is for the data user himself but not for other persons. It is different from proxy re-encryption. So, if the revoked user and the cloud server collude, though they can access the data encrypted before revocation, we can ignore this kind of attack. Proof: Suppose B intends to solve the BDH problem with random instances < aP, bp, cP > and its ultimate goal e(P, P) abc . Now it will act the challenger to interact with the adversary A o . In the beginning, B setups public parameters
Before A o makes some queries, it selects I ∈ [1, q 1 ]. Hash queries. All hash queries are answered by randomly choosing a proper element. The detailed query-answers are
Private key queries. When B receives a private key query on (ID i ), it searches the H 1 list for < (ID i , x i , x i P) > and computes SK ID i = x i aP as the answer. Note that if i = I , B aborts the game.
Time key queries. When B receives a time key query on (ID i , t i ), it searches the H 2 list for < (ID i , t i , y i , y i P) > and computes TK ID i ,t i = y i aP as the answer.
Decryption queries. When B receives a decryption query on (C = (U , V , W ), ID, t), it runs Decrypt(params, C, SK ID , TK ID,t ) by extracting the private key SK ID and the time key TK ID,t firstly. If i = I , without loss of indistinguishability from the reality, suppose the ciphertext is not generated by A o itself and C acts as follows.
• Choose M ∈ R {0, 1} l and return M as the answer;
• Pick r ∈ R Z * q and set H 3 (σ, M ) = r. Actually, due to the difficulty of Discrete Logarithm (U = rP →r), the equation r =r holds just with negligible probability. So, if A o makes the H 3 (σ, M ) query, the answer is easy to be found incorrect. However, it is not difficult to see that if the H 3 (σ, M ) query occurs, A o has made H 4 (BDH(Q ID i , U , P 0 )) before with non-negligible probability for the computation of σ . Since BDH(Q ID i , U , P 0 ) is a BDH problem, our decryption query implementation seems real to the adversary A o .
After that, A o outputs two messages (M 0 , M 1 ) and the identity ID * and the time period t * that it wants to challenge. If ID * = ID I , B aborts the game; otherwise, B generates a
A o continues to make more queries as before, except the private key query on ID * and the decryption query on (C * , ID * , t * ).
At the end of the game, A o outputs its guess for β. B picks a tuple (E, h) at random from the H 4 list and outputs the E as the solution to the BDH problem.
Analysis. If B does not abort the game and A o can break the IND-CCA security of the scheme with advantage , B can solve the BDH problem with probability ≥ /q 4 . Clearly, the game will not abort if ID * = ID I . So, ≥ /(q 1 · q 4 ). Theorem 3: The hash functions are viewed as random oracles. If there exists an inside adversary A i against the IND-CCA security of our scheme with advantage , making q 2 times H 2 hash queries and q 4 times H 4 hash queries, then there exists an algorithm B that can solve the BDH problem with probability ≥ /(q 2 · q 4 ).
Proof: In this proof, B is still a solver to the BDH problem with random instances < aP, bp, cP > and its goal is to compute e(P, P) abc . It acts as the challenger interacting with the adversary A i . B setups public parameters as
Before A i makes queries, it selects I ∈ [1, q 2 ] and suppose the I th query to the H 2 oracle is on (ID * , t * ).
Hash queries. All hash queries are answered by randomly choosing a proper element. The detailed query-answers are
Private key queries. When B receives a private key query on (ID i ), it searches the H 1 list for < (ID i , x i , x i P) > and computes SK ID i = x i aP as the answer.
Time key queries. When B receives a time key query on (ID i , t j ), it searches the H 2 list for < (ID i , t j , y, yP) > and computes TK ID i ,t j = yaP as the answer. Note that if (ID i , t j ) = (ID * , t * ), B aborts the game. VOLUME 6, 2018 Decryption queries. When B receives a decryption query on (C = (U , V , W ), ID, t), it runs Decrypt(params, C, SK ID , TK ID,t ) by extracting the private key SK ID and the time key TK ID,t firstly. If (ID i , t j ) = (ID * , t * ), without loss of indistinguishability from the reality, suppose the ciphertext is not generated by A i itself and C works as follows.
• Pick r ∈ R Z * q and set H 3 (σ, M ) = r. Similarly, due to the difficulty of Discrete Logarithm (U =rP →r), the equation r =r holds just with negligible probability. So, if A i makes the H 3 (σ, M ) query, the answer is easy to be found incorrect. However, it is not difficult to see that if the H 3 (σ, M ) query occurs, A i has made H 4 (BDH(Q ID,t , U , P 0 )) before with non-negligible probability for the computation of σ . Since to compute BDH(Q ID,t , U , P 0 ) is a hard problem, our decryption simulation seems real to the adversary A i .
After that, A i launches the challenge by outputting two messages (M 0 , M 1 ) and an identity ID * and a time period t * . B generates a challenge ciphertext C * = (U * , V * , W * ) by setting
A i continues to make more queries as before, except the time key query on (ID * , t * ) and the decryption query on (C * , ID * , t * ).
At the end of the game, A i outputs its guess for β. B picks a tuple (E, h) at random from the H 4 list and outputs the E as the solution to the BDH problem.
Analysis. Similar to the analysis of the above proof, If B does not abort the game and A i can break the IND-CCA security of the scheme with advantage , B can solve the BDH problem with probability ≥ /q 4 . Since the probability that the game does not abort is 1/q 2 , the probability ≥ /(q 2 · q 4 ).
D. THE EFFICIENCY
This section evaluates the efficiency by comparing our scheme with some representative related schemes [15] , [10] and [14] . We build the experiment platform on a windows 10 machine which is equiped with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4460S CPU colcked at 2.9GHZ and 4GB system memory. The cryptography library that we choose is JPBC Library. The element length of group G 1 and G 2 in our scheme is 512-bit. For a 128-bit message, the running time for PrivateKey-Extract, Time-Key-Update, Encrypt, Decrypt and Ciphertext-Evolve is 13ms, 13ms, 33ms, 16ms and 8ms, respectively. Table 1 makes efficiency comparison via main calculations, the exponential computation and the bilinear pairing. The algorithms include 1) generations of private key, time key, decryption key and re-encryption key; 2) encryption, decryption and ciphertext evolution. Then we make further comparison in Table 2 , including a) the length of the decryption key list and the ciphertext after evolution; b) whether the ciphertexts prior to revocation are still available to the revoked user; c) the security level and the party implementing revocation. Table 3 describes the notations.
From the comparisons above, except for the comparable efficiency to the existing schemes in encryption and decryption, we can see that our scheme performs better in the following aspects:
• more efficient in generations of private key, time key, decryption key and re-encryption key, and decryption;
• solving the two problems simultaneously with constant ciphertext after evolutions in the cloud.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper focussed on the user revocation problem in identity-based encryption. One of the efficient revocation methods is to issue time keys periodically via public channels for non-revoked users. We take the scenario of cloud storage as consideration and find that most of the existing works suffer from increasing decryption key list or accessability to ciphertexts prior to revocation. Though the technique of proxy re-encryption can solve the two problems, the length of the ciphertexts grow linearly with the number of ciphertextevolutions. Therefore, it is a heavy burden to the server when the data is big. Additionally, the users have to put more computation and communication resource on re-encryption keys. This is not suitable for source-limited applications. In this paper, we presented an efficient solution to the two aforementioned problems simultaneously. The size of a ciphertext in the cloud remains constant, no matter how many times the ciphertext evolves. The new revocable identity-based encryption with ciphertext evolution scheme is constructed by using bilinear parings. The time keys are generated by the PKG periodically and sent to both the user and the cloud. The cloud makes ciphertext evolution by using the time keys. Hence, no extra key computations are involved in our construction. It is efficient for the data sharing application in the cloud. Our scheme enjoys provably strong security against chosen ciphertext attacks based on standard hard problem. VOLUME 6, 2018 
